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ANTITRUST AND THE FCC:
THE PROBLEM OF NETWORK DOMINANCE
BmNmA SORwARTz t
In a memorandum submitted last year, Professor Schwartz, then chief
counsel of the House Legislative Oversight Subcommittee, asserted that the
Federal Communications Commission had failed to implement antitrust laws
and policies, and that its dereliction constituted a breach of its statutory
obligation to protect the public interest. This Article, at least in part,
documents and substantiates that charge. Starting from the premise that
monopoly in mass communicatioin is inconsistent with the public interest, Pro-
fessor Schwartz marshals evidence tending to show that in recent years the
Commission has acquiesced in the growing dominance of the huge radio and
television networks, despite a well defined congressional policy against exces-
sive concentration in broadcasting. The author's stormy six months in;
Washington, and the program for further investigation and reform of the
commissions which resulted from them, are the subject of his recently pub-
lished book, The Professor and the Commissions.
Administrative law, almost more than any other branch of the
law, well exemplifies Cardozo's famous statement that the law has its
periods of ebb and flow. Twenty years ago, the administrative process
was seen by its proponents as the great hope in our governmental
system. Through it they hoped to work a progressive modification of
the economy and the society, comparable, at the very least, to the great
English Reform Movement of the last century. Many of them, in fact,
t Professor of Law, New York University Law School. B.S.S., 1944, College
of the City of New York; LL.B., 1944, New York University; LL.M., 1945, Harvard
University; Ph.D., 1947, LL.D., 1956, Cambridge University.
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went even further and saw in administration the ultimate supplanter of
private industry, which would take over the role of economic leadership
in the "public interest." '
The twenty years that have elapsed have served to demonstrate
how exaggerated these hopes were. The grand vision of the 1930's
has been succeeded by a mood of doubt among those informed
about the operation of the great federal agencies. There has been, in
fact, a widely expressed skepticism about the impartiality of agency
proceedings, particularly in the Federal Communications Commission.2
There can be little doubt that public concern about the FCC bears a
direct relationship to the disclosure of improprieties in that commission
made during the 1958 hearings of the House Legislative Oversight
Subcommittee. 3
Most of the public concern with the FCC's work has focused upon
the Commission's comparative television decisions--i.e., those deciding
which among two or more competing applicants shall be awarded
television licenses.4 It would, nevertheless, be a mistake to assume
that it is only in the field of television licensing that the FCC has been
deficient. In a noted article of a few years ago, Professor Huntington
dealt with what he termed the "marasmus" of one of the great federal
regulatory commissions.5 It is most unlikely that the pathological
condition from which such an agency suffers will be reflected in only
one aspect of its work. Instead, as Huntington showed, such com-
mission's illness permeates all phases of its operations.
The primary symptom of the administrative marasmus of which
Huntington wrote is the agency's passivity in protecting the public
interest. More and more, the sick Commission fails to give effect to
the public interest, whose vindication was the principal reason for the
creation of the agency itself. Instead, in such a commission, the public
tends ever-increasingly to become identified with the interest of the
dominant groups in the regulated industry.'
1. See Jaffe, Ttw Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevalu-
atim, 67 HAnv. L. Rmv. 1105, 1107 (1954).
2. Thus, a recent headline in the New York Times read: "F.C.C. Prestige at
Record Low." N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1958, § 4, p. 8, col. 1.
3. Even before these disclosures were made, close students of the FCC had
expressed uneasiness. See, e.g., Jaffe, The Scandal in TV Licensing, Harper's, Sept.
1957, p. 77.
4. Ibid.
5. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and
the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952). "Marasmus" is defined as a "gradual
and continuous wasting away of the bulk of the body fromr some morbid cause."
Id. at 470 nll.
6. See ScHwARTz, THE PROFESSOR AND THE COMMISSIONS CIL 5 (1959), for a
detailed treatment of this theme.
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In the FCC, as already indicated, most of the public attention has
been focused upon the improprieties revealed in the Commission's
television licensing decisions. Comparable in importance to them,
however-at least in its impact upon the public interest-has been
the Commission's failure to implement antitrust laws and policies. In
a memorandum submitted on January 4, 1958 by the present writer as
chief counsel of the Legislative Oversight Subcommittee, it was asserted
that in recent years, the Federal Communications Commission had
failed to give effect to antitrust considerations.
"In a number of cases the Commission has refused to consider
possible antitrust violations on the part of applicants before it on
the ground that it can act only if there has been a final adjudication
by a court of such violation. The subcommittee should publicly
explore the question of whether the commission's approach in these
cases is justified." 7
As it turned out, the Oversight Subcommittee, diverted as it be-
came by political and other considerations, never did adequately explore
the antitrust aspects of the FCC's work. Yet few phases of the
Commission's operations are of greater practical importance; for the
FCC's actions in this area will, in large part, determine the extent to
which there is undue concentration of ownership and control in the
field of broadcasting-a concentration which itself is of great conse-
quence in a system dominated by the philosophy underlying the first
amendment."
In the present Article, this writer will try to present some of the
materials which led him to assert, in his already-referred-to subcom-
mittee memorandum, that the FCC had failed to give effect to antitrust
policies. Such presentation should be of value, not only in the light of
the current popular concern with the FCC, but also for what it may
tell us of the actual operation of an important federal agency. In this
area of its work, we shall see, there is a wide variance between what
the FCC is supposed to do and what it really does.
NBC-WESTINGHOUSE CASE
The FCC's disregard of antitrust policies can hardly be better
illustrated than through an examination of the so-called NBC-Westing-
house case. This case arose out of an exchange of television stations
7. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1958, p. 14, col. 5.
8. "The First Amendment . . . rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public .... " Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945).
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between the National Broadcasting Company and the Westinghouse
Broadcasting Company. In 1953, Westinghouse had purchased Station
WPTZ-TV in Philadelphia for $8,500,000-at that time the highest
priced TV station sale in history. Less than two years later, NBC
sought to acquire the station. After some months of negotiations, an
agreement was entered into in May 1955, under which Westinghouse
exchanged its Philadelphia station for an NBC-owned TV station in
Cleveland, plus a payment of $3,000,000 by NBC.9 The exchange
required approval of the FCC, which the Commission granted without
hearing at the end of 1955.?°
A year later, in December 1956, the Department of Justice filed a
civil antitrust complaint, praying that the court adjudge the exchange
agreement to be in violation of the Sherman Act " and revoke NBC's
license to operate the Philadelphia station. The district court, in a
1958 decision, held that the Government's suit could not be enter-
tained." The FCC, said Chief Judge Kirkpatrick, has primary juris-
diction to determine whether an exchange of television stations violates
the antitrust laws. In approving the instant exchange agreement as in
the "public interest," I the Commission must necessarily have deter-
mined that there was no antitrust violation. Such an FCC deter-
mination can only be challenged under the appeal provisions of the
Communications Act. It cannot be attacked in a subsequent antitrust
action by the Government.
The merits of Judge Kirkpatrick's application of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine do not concern us here. What is of moment for
purposes of the present Article is the basic factual assumption upon
which the district court decision was grounded. This is the assumption
that the FCC had fully heard and considered the antitrust aspects of the
case. "The FCC," asserted Judge Kirkpatrick, "requested and obtained
from the parties all of the information which the Government now has
and on which it bases this suit. The FCC was under a duty to pass
upon the issues presented by this evidence. The . . . FCC decided
all issues relating to the exchange which it could lawfully decide." "4
What actually happened in the FCC in the NBC-Westinghouse
case is basically inconsistent with the assumption that antitrust factors
9. Radio stations in Philadelphia and Cleveland were also involved in the exchange.
10. National Broadcasting Co., 13 P & F RADIo REG. 374 (1955).
11. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
12. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 158 F. Supp. 333 (MD. Pa. 1958).
13. 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §310(b) (1952).
14. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 158 F. Supp. 333, 335-36 (E.D. Pa.
1952). Judge Kirkpatrick's decision was reversed by the Supreme Court on Febru-
ary 24, 1959. 79 Sup. Ct. 457 (1959). The reversal does not, however, alter the
substance of our discussion.
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were adequately considered by the Commission. When the FCC
received the application for approval of the NBC-Westinghouse ex-
change agreement, its staff, in accordance with its usual practice, made
a routine investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding
the transaction. In the course of its inquiry into the case, the FCC
staff found some disturbing things.
In the first place, the staff reports to the Commission indicated
that coercion had been brought upon Westinghouse by the representa-
tives of NBC. The Philadelphia station had an NBC affiliation, which
could be withdrawn almost at will.' As a memorandum from the
Chief of the FCC Broadcast Bureau put it, "The vital force of a major
network affiliation hung constantly over these negotiations, exerting
its own pressure without ever expressly coming to the forefront." 1"
The staff reported that NBC had convinced Westinghouse that it
(NBC) could acquire another television station in Philadelphia if
Westinghouse did not agree to the NBC proposal. This would mean
the end of the NBC affiliation for the Westinghouse Philadelphia
station.17  In addition, there was at least a veiled threat that, unless it
signed, Westinghouse might lose a valuable NBC affiliation in Boston
and fail to obtain one for which it was then negotiating in Pittsburgh.
The president of Westinghouse aptly characterized the action of the
NBC representatives as a "muscling job." " In the conclusion of the
Broadcast Bureau Chief's memorandum, Westinghouse "was compelled
by the combination of the value of the network affiliation and the
availability of another station to which NBC could take its connection,
to go along with this transaction which it did not seek and did not
want. . .,, 19
But the FCC staff found more than evidence of coercion by NBC
in this case. In addition, it informed the Commission that the NBC
acquisition of the Philadelphia station would present a serious problem
15. Affiliation contracts, under the relevant FCC regulation, can run for no longer
than two years. 47 C.F.R. §3.133 (1958). The importance of the NBC affiliation
in the instant case is shown by the fact that, of the total $8,500,000 paid by Westing-
house for the Philadelphia station in 1953, $5,000,000 was expressly paid for the
NBC affiliation. See House Comm. on the Judiciary, Antitrust Subcomm., Report
on Televis~iot Broadcasting, H.R. REP. No. 607, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1957)
(hereinafter cited as Report on Television Broadcasting).
16. FCC Interoffice Memorandum to the Commission From Chief, Broadcast
Bureau, Sept. 26, 1955, reprinted in Hearings Before Antitrust Subcommittee No. 5
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 22, at 3193,
3194 (1957) (hereinafter cited as ANqTTRusT Suncommi=rr REPORT).
17. Westinghouse itself had stated in a letter to the FCC that "it could only be
concluded by Westinghouse that this would spell the end of an NBC affiliation with
the Westinghouse Television Station WPTZ in that market at the expiration of the
current agreement." Westinghouse Reply, Nov. 10, 1955, reprinted in id. at 3338, 3340.
18. Quoted in id. at 3120.
19. Id. at 3195.
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of concentration. "This demonstration of network power," said the
memorandum already quoted, "and the readiness to employ it to gain
wanted ends, merits consideration in relation to the other problems
in this case-concentration of control and overlap." 20 NBC already
owned television stations in New York City and Washington and had
applications pending for stations in Buffalo, N.Y., and New Britain,
Conn. If the FCC were to grant these NBC applications, it would give
that company a substantial grip on the Middle Atlantic area. To give
NBC in addition a Philadelphia channel would result in what the FCC
staff termed a concentration of control greater than that which exists
anywhere in this country.21 "It was and still remains the position of
the Chief, Broadcast Bureau," declared that official in another memo-
randum to the Commission, "that the Philadelphia acquisition cannot
be considered except in relation to the attempts, by NBC, to make
additional acquisitions of broadcast properties in New Britain and
Buffalo. So considered, the aggregation of stations contemplated by
the New Britain, Buffalo, and Philadelphia applications presents a
serious problem of area concentration." '
These staff memoranda clearly appeared to raise serious questions
for the FCC to consider before deciding whether to approve the NBC-
Westinghouse exchange: 1) Did the pressure by NBC on Westing-
house to sell the more profitable Philadelphia station for a less profitable
Cleveland station-through the threat of removing its network affilia-
tion-constitute duress? 2) Did the apparent withholding of the NBC
affiliation for Westinghouse's Pittsburgh station, until the Philadelphia-
Cleveland exchange was agreed to, constitute a tie-in arrangement
contrary to the public interest? ' 3) Is it consistent with the public
interest for a major network to use the leverage of network affiliation
to enhance its own competitive position as a broadcaster? 4) Is area
concentration as great as that involved in this case consistent with the
public interest? 24
The staff memoranda, at the least, indicated a need for further
FCC inquiry into the case. In the apt statement of the chairman of a
House subcommittee to the FCC head, "You certainly had danger
20. Ibid.
21. Id. at 3196.
22. FCC Interoffice Memorandum to the Commission From Chief, Broadcast
Bureau, Dec. 16, 1955, reprinted in id. at 3197, 3201.
23. Compare Commissioner Bartley, dissenting in National Broadcasting Co.,
13 P & F RADIO REG. 374 (1955).
24. According to the memorandum from the Chief of the FCC Broadcast Bureau,
supra note 16, "If any area concentration, short of duopoly, is to present a problem
for the Commission, this would seem to be it." ANTITRUST SuBCOmmI= REPORT
3196.
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signals flashed upon you, and I think-I say this with every degree
of attempt to be fair to you, Mr. Chairman and your colleagues-I think
those danger signals were sufficient to give emphasis to the need for
some sort of inquiry into these operations." 2 But the FCC voted to
approve the exchange without any hearing at all on the matter.26 One
can hardly help but feel, as did a congressional committee which studied
the case, that, "in light of all the evidence before the Commission, its
failure to order a hearing . . . was improvident, to say the least." 27
The later complaint filed by the Department of Justice against
NBC and its parent corporation (Radio Corporation of America)
alleged that defendants had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act2
by combining and conspiring to obtain television ownership for NBC
in five of the eight largest markets in the country "by the unlawful use
of the power of the defendant NBC, as a network, to grant to or with-
hold from nonnetwork station owners, NBC network affiliation for
their television stations." 29
Certainly the facts and circumstances surrounding the NBC-
Westinghouse exchange, so far as they were revealed to the FCC in
its own staff memoranda, appeared to raise serious antitrust questions.
In such a case, it would seem that the least the Commission ought to
have done before deciding whether to approve the exchange was to
consult fully with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
In the words of the House Antitrust Subcommittee, effective liaison
between the FCC and the Antitrust Division is a prime essential in a
case like this: "The specialized experience of those charged with anti-
trust enforcement must be made available to the Commission with
respect to antitrust problems that arise in connection with regulatory
activity. Failure of such liaison may result in inadequate consideration
of antitrust principles." "
The FCC did, it is true, notify the Antitrust Division, in August
1955, of the pendency of the proposed station exchange and also made
its staff reports on the case available.31 But that was the total extent
of its liaison. By December 27, 1955, Stanley N. Barnes (then the
25. Id. at 3124.
26. It did send a so-called § 309(c) letter (48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47
U.S.C. §309(c) (1952)) to NBC and Westinghouse asking for their views on certain
aspects of the exchange. This is, however, hardly an adequate substitute for a full
hearing. The NBC and Westinghouse replies are reprinted in ANTITRUST SUBCOM-
m ITEE REPORT 3312, 3338.
27. Report on Television Broadcasting 107.
28. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
29. Reprinted in ANTITRUST SuBcommm REXoR 3204.
30. Report on Television Broadcasting 95.
31. See ANMTRUST Suacom iMTTE REPORT 3131.
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head of Antitrust) concluded that there were serious antitrust questions
in the case. On that date, he sent a letter to the FCC in which he
asserted: "There appears to be a serious question as to whether or not
the proposed transfer is unreasonably restrictive, and thus violative of
the Sherman Act." 3 He also stated that the Antitrust Division was
undertaking a preliminary investigation and that "it is not anticipated
that this inquiry will take a considerable amount of time." I
In light of Judge Barnes' statement, it would not seem unreason-
able for the FCC to have waited until the results of the Antitrust Di-
vision's preliminary inquiry were communicated to it. But the
Commission had already voted, on December 21, to approve the NBC-
Westinghouse exchange.3 Since the Barnes letter was sent almost a
week after that date, it is clear that the FCC's "liaison" with Antitrust
did not even include the elementary step of informing that Division of
its contemplated action in the case. When the Barnes letter was de-
livered to the office of the FCC chairman on the morning of December
27 by special messenger, all the same, it was not too late for the Com-
mission to consider it, since its December 21 decision had not yet been
made public. It seems, however, that the Barnes letter was "lost" in
the FCC until the decision approving the exchange was made public on
December 28." Actually, the members of the Commission did not
receive copies of the letter for another week.36 Even then, it is true,
the FCC could have acted, for, under the Communications Act,3" it has
power on its own motion to revoke any order made by it without
hearing. Yet it was certainly much harder for the Commission, in
effect, to repudiate its own decision after it had been publicly announced.
That the FCC failure to have available to it the views of the
Antitrust Division before it decided the NBC-Westinghouse case was
unfortunate appears to be an understatement. The opinion of the
agency endowed with specialized experience in the field that an anti-
trust violation might well be involved in the station exchange should,
even without more, have put a warning finger to the lips of the
Commission before it articulated its decision. The Antitrust Division
doubts, expressed in the Barnes letter, should, at the least, have induced
the FCC to hold a hearing in which it could fully explore the matter.
32. Judge Barnes' letter is reprinted in id. at 3132.
33. Ibid.
34. See id. at 3133.
35. Ibid. It is to this incident that Anthony Lewis of the New York Times
referred, in a recent address, when he said, "The Communications Commission 'loses'
a letter from the Department objecting to a station transfer on antitrust grounds."
See 104 CoNG. REc. 7254 (daily ed. May 6, 1958).
36. ANTrmrusT S BcommrrEE REPoRT 3137.
37. 48 Stat. 1085, 1094 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§309(c), 403 (1952).
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In addition, it has since been revealed that the Antitrust Division's
conclusion of a probable antitrust violation was based upon materials
which the FCC itself did not have. As Judge Barnes himself put it,
when asked by a congressional committee whether the view expressed
in his December 27 letter was based solely on documents made available
to him by the FCC, "No, sir; I do not think that that is a fair conclu-
sion, by reason of the fact that we have certain documents that I am
sure they did not have. We had certain reports or interviews with
individuals which, by the very nature I am almost certain that they
did not have." " We do not, of course, know what the information
was that Judge Barnes referred to here. But it certainly seems clear
that the FCC, in summarily approving the exchange, deprived itself of
the opportunity to obtain, through hearing, a complete picture of the
facts and circumstances in the case.
One familiar with the NBC-Westinghouse case cannot help but
conclude, as did the House Antitrust Subcommittee which investigated
the FCC's action in the matter,
"that in approving the NBC-Westinghouse exchange of 1955
without a hearing, without consideration of the specific antitrust
histories of the applicants and their parent corporations, and
without maintaining adequate liaison with the Antitrust Division
of -the Department of Justice, the Federal Communications Com-
missions fell short of performance fully protecting the public
interest." 3'
In hearings of the House subcommittee just quoted, the members
of the FCC were questioned about their actions in the NBC-Westing-
house case. Their answers provide a privileged insight into the mental
processes of the commissioners in antitrust matters, such as students of
the administrative process are rarely fortunate enough to obtain. And
what the FCC members revealed about their reasons for acting as they
did has, to say the least, disturbing implications for one concerned with
the enforcement of antitrust policies by the Commission.
During the House hearings, the then chairman of the FCC,
George C. McConnaughey, was asked why the Commission had not
held a hearing to determine whether the allegations of coercion made
in its staff memoranda were well founded. He replied that the Com-
mission had been convinced that there was no need for hearing by the
answers made by NBC and Westinghouse to FCC letters informing
them of the allegations of duress: 4" "We got the replies to those from
38. AN US SUBcommrrTE REPORT 3150.
39. Report on Television Broadcasting 108.
40. See note 26 mtpra.
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both Westinghouse and from the National Broadcasting Co. and those
replies indicated to a majority of the Commission that there was no
duress in this transaction. That is the reason it was approved." 41
The substantial evidence of coercion developed in the FCC staff
reports was, in other words, negatived in the Commission's minds by
the mere fact that the parties alleged to have been involved did not
admit such coercion." "You accepted the letter on its face value?"
Mr. McConnaughey was asked. "We certainly did," was the FCC
chairman's reply.43
It should, nevertheless, be obvious that, if there was actual duress,
the parties involved would be the last persons frankly to avow it-
especially in a formal letter, without questioning and cross-examination.
The one who had been guilty of coercion would certainly not admit it if
he could help it, especially since it might reasonably be assumed that
such a confession would ipso facto result in punitive measures by the
Commission.
It was just as unrealistic to expect the party who had yielded to
the coercion readily to acknowledge as much in its formal letter to the
FCC. If the threat of the loss of NBC affiliation had actually forced
Westinghouse to part, against its will, with a TV station worth millions,
the same NBC influence would surely have continued while the case
was pending in the FCC.
An even more disturbing element than the administrative naivete
which the foregoing illustrates emerges from the testimony of Com-
missioner John C. Doerfer, who became FCC chairman in 1957. Doer-
fer denied that the NBC-Westinghouse case raised any problems of
undue concentration, and went on to say, "Concentration does not
frighten me under those circumstances. . . . If the competitive prin-
ciples of this country do not take care of that situation, then we are
hopelessly sunk." " In any case, the problem of concentration was not
really the concern of the FCC. The Commission's duty was to ensure
that the public received comparable television fare, and here the public
would have "just as much television, before or after, in the same area.
. What you had was a change of ownership. You may have
some difference with respect to local programming, but the public
wasn't being hurt." 4 Asked whether it would disturb him if the
record revealed at every turn a dominant position of one or two com-
41. AN TITUST SUBCOmmTrEE REPoRT 3122-23.
42. Neither the NBC nor Westinghouse letters, it should be noted, contained
express denials of coercion. See id. at 3312, 3339.
43. Id. at 3126.
44. Id. at 3152.
45. Id. at 3151-52.
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panies in television, Doerfer replied that it would not, and explained,
"Somebody has to be dominant. Somebody is big. . [D]omi-
nance is just the natural result of the ebb and flow of business relations
from day to day. . . . [W]hen you are talking about dominance,
there is always somebody that is dominant." "
ANTITRUST POLICIES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
This expression by one uniquely situated to affect decisions
raises serious questions about the FCC's performance of its statutory
duty to give effect to the antitrust laws. It is, of course, true that the
FCC has no authority directly to enforce the Sherman Act and other
antitrust laws as such.4" At the same time, it is clear, as the FCC
chairman himself conceded in 1956, that the Commission "has the
obligation . . . to maintain a system of broadcast compatible with
the antitrust laws. . . ." " The FCC's obligation in this respect
results directly from the provisions of the Communications Act.
There is, in the first place, the underlying policy of the Congress
which induced it to set up a system of governmental regulation in the
field of broadcasting. In enacting the Communications Act, the
Supreme Court has informed us, "Congress moved under the spur of
a widespread fear that in the absence of governmental control the
public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in
the broadcasting field." " More recently, the chairman of the Senate
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce has stated the obliga-
tion that this imposes upon those charged with implementing the
congressional policy. The Communications Act, he said, repudiates
the notion of a governmentally-operated monopoly of the air waves.
"But when a monopoly of this sort, too great for the Government
to operate, is entrusted to those presumed to be best qualified-
from among many who are willing to assume it, and to be held
accountable for its use or abuse-there results a continuing respon-
sibility upon both the Congress and its administrative arm, the
FCC, to insure that private monopoly does not occur where
Government monopoly is avoided." 5'
46. Id. at 3154.
47. 48 Stat. 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 313 (1952).
48. Except for its limited authority, thus far never exercised, to enforce § 7 of
the Clayton Act against "common carriers engaged in wire or radio communication
or radio transmission of energy." 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §21
(1952).
49. ANTITRUSr SuBcomrnxa REPORT 3113.
50. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
51. PLoTKIN, TELEVIsION NETWORK REGULATIONS AND THE UHF PROBLEi iii
(Comm. Print 1955) (hereinafter cited as PLonTN).
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One who compares the Communications Act with other regulatory
statutes, like the Interstate Commerce Act, notes immediately that the
FCC, unlike the ICC,52 is not given power to grant any antitrust im-
munity to broadcasters. On the contrary, the Communications Act
expressly declares that "all laws of the United States relating to unlaw-
ful restraints and monopolies and to combinations, contracts, or agree-
ments in restraint of trade are declared to be applicable to .
interstate or foreign radio communications." I It also provides that, in
antitrust cases, the court may, as an additional form of relief, direct
the revocation of broadcast licenses held by a party found guilty of
antitrust violations. And the FCC is expressly directed to refuse a
license to any person whose license has been revoked by a court in any
antitrust proceeding. 4
The basic statutory standard under which the FCC exercises regu-
latory authority over broadcasting is in particular that of "public con-'
venience, interest, or necessity."' ' In applying the public interest
touchstone in particular cases, the Commission must of necessity con-
sider the impact of its action upon antitrust considerations. In Justice
Frankfurter's words in a leading case, "Congress can hardly be deemed
to have limited the concept of 'public interest' so as to exclude all
considerations relating to monopoly and unreasonable 'restraints upon
commerce." 56 On the contrary, in a field such as broadcasting, the
promotion of antitrust policies is a vital part of regulation in the public
interest. "Monopoly in the mass communication of news and advertis-
ing," the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has7 declared,
"is contrary to the public interest, even if not in terms proscribed by
the antitrust laws." n
The Congress intended the field of broadcasting to be basically
one of free competition.58 Indeed, the FCC has gone so far as to assert
52. The Interstate Commerce Act provides expressly that "any carriers .
participating in a transaction approved or authorized . . . are relieved from the
operation of the antitrust laws. . . ." 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 5(11) (1952). See the comparable provisions of the Shipping Act, 39. Stat. 733
(1916), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1952), and the Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 1004 (1938),
as amended, 49 U.S.C. §494 (1952).
53. 48 Stat. 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §313 (1952).
54. 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §311 (1952). -
55. 48 Stat. 1083, 1086, 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§307, 312, 316
(1952).
56. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223 (1943).
57. Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
58. In FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 US. 470, 474-75 (1940), the
Court said, "The act recognizes that the field of broadcasting is one of free com-
petition. The sections dealing with broadcasting demonstrate that Congress has not,
in its regulatory scheme, abandoned the principle of free competition, as it has done
in the case of railroads, in respect of which regulation involves the suppression of
wasteful practices due to competition, the regulation of ratds and charges, and other
measures which are unnecessary if free competition is to be permitted."
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that "Congress conceived as one of the Commission's major functions
the preservation of competition in the radio field." " If a licensee or
an applicant is engaged in monopolistic or other practices which unduly
restrain competition, the FCC must take that into account in applying
the "public interest" criterion.
It is thus clear that, as the chairman of the FCC recently acknowl-
edged, "the Commission has a unique responsibility to conform its
regulatory activities with the letter and spirit of the antitrust laws.
" The reason why this is true was well stated by the FCC in
its 1941 Report on Chain Broadcasting, in a passage that was later
quoted with approval by the Supreme Court:
"The prohibitions of the Sherman Act apply to broadcasting.
This Commission, although not charged with the duty of enforcing
that law, should administer its regulatory powers with respect
to broadcasting in the light of the purposes which the Sherman
Act was designed to achieve. . . . It is not our function to apply
the antitrust laws as such. It is our duty, however, to refuse
licenses or renewals to any person who engages or proposes to
engage in practices which will prevent either himself or other
licensees or both from making the fullest use of radio facilities.
This is the standard of public interest, convenience or necessity
which we must apply. . . . We do not predicate our jurisdiction
to issue the regulations on the ground that the network practices
violate the antitrust laws. We are issuing these regulations be-
cause we have found that the network practices prevent the maxi-
mum utilization of radio facilities in the public interest." 6'
Perhaps the clearest court decision affirming the power of the
FCC to give effect to antitrust policies under the "public interest"
standard is Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC.' The Commission there
had determined that it was contrary to the public interest to grant a
broadcast license to a newspaper company which had attempted to
suppress competition in advertising and news dissemination. The
newspaper claimed that the Commission could not thus consider its
competitive activities and, in effect, enforce the antitrust laws through
its licensing powers. The court completely rejected this contention.
According to it, the FCC's application of antitrust policies in this case
was "a sound application of what has long been the general policy of
the United States." 6 Nor did the availability of the specific remedies
59. No. 9572, 1 P & F RADIO REG. (pt. 3) 91:495, 91:500 (1951).
60. ANTITRUST SuBcommiTEE REPoRT 3114.
61. FCC, REPORT oN CHAIN BROADCASTING 46, 83 (1941), quoted in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223 (1943).
62. 180 F2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
63. Id. at 33.
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provided under the antitrust laws bar the Commission from acting as
it did.
"The fact that a policy against monopoly has been made the
subject of criminal sanction by Congress as to certain activities
does not preclude an administrative agency charged with furthering
the public interest from holding the general policy of Congress to
be applicable to questions arising in the proper discharge of its
duties." 04
LICENSING
One of the striking things about the FCC's action in the already-
discussed NBC-Westinghouse case was the failure of the Commission
to consider the antitrust history of the parties involved. Both NBC
and Westinghouse, as well as their parent corporations, had been sued
many times in antitrust actions." Indeed, at the time the Commission
was considering the proposed exchange of television stations, there was
pending an important antitrust suit brought by the Department of
Justice against the Radio Corporation of America (NBC's parent cor-
poration) for alleged monopolization of trade and commerce in radio-
television research, patent holding and patent acquisition, and the
issuance and exchange of radio-television patent licenses. 66 During
the House Antitrust Subcommittee hearings on the NBC-Westinghouse
case, the FCC chairman was asked expressly whether the Commission
had specifically considered the antitrust suits filed and the cases decided
against the parties. "I don't think so," replied the FCC head.67  No
reason was given for the Commission's failure to do so. As the House
Subcommittee put it, "Commission failure to consider these matters
remains unexplained." 68
The FCC's non-consideration of the antitrust history of the parties
in the NBC-Westinghouse case was contrary to what the Commission
itself has publicly professed to be its policy. The FCC chairman him-
self, in his prepared statement before the Antitrust Subcommittee, said,
"[W]e have recognized that in individual licensing proceedings, we
can and must consider the past antitrust histories of potential applicants
in determining whether the grant of a license to such applicants would
serve the public interest." 69
64. Ibid.
65. See Report on Television Broadcasting 104, for a comprehensive list of these
actions.
66. Ibid. See text accompanying note 215 infra.
67. ANTITRUST SUBcom Tu- REPORT 3236.
68. Report on Television Broadcasting 105.
69. ANTrrTUsT SUBCOMMrnIM REPORT 3181.
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In 1950, the FCC, acting on its own motion, held a public proceed-
ing in which the Department of Justice and a number of private parties
participated. The purpose of the proceeding was to explore the ques-
tion of what policy the Commission should adopt in licensing cases
where one or more applicants had violated laws of the United States
other than the Communications Act. Most of the parties who presented
argument on the question had, at one time or another, been the subjects
of antitrust actions and most of the argument was directed to cases
involving applicants with antitrust histories. In 1951, the FCC issued
a report on the matter in which it articulated the general policies which
it would follow in such cases.7" In it the Commission emphasized the
relevancy of antitrust violations to its consideration of whether a par-
ticular applicant was qualified to serve the "public interest." The FCC
report in question declares,
"It is important that only those persons should be licensed who
can be relied upon to operate in the public interest, and not engage
in monopolistic practices. When passing upon applications of
persons who have engaged in monopolistic practices, . . the
Commission must be concerned as to whether such persons would
also engage in monopolistic practices in radio if given a license.
Their conduct . . . is obviously a matter which the Commission
must consider in determining whether they possess the requisite
qualifications of a licensee." 7'
As more recently explained by the FCC chairman, this 1951
report
"clearly stated that antitrust considerations were relevant to the
public-interest determination to be made by the Commission, and
would be considered on their individual merits whenever a signifi-
cant issue as to possible antitrust problems appeared to be
presented." 72
The approach thus laid down by the FCC in its 1951 report is
clearly sound. In the words of the Mansfield Journal case,
"[C] ertainly, in determining whether a particular applicant should
be permitted to operate so important and restricted a facility as a
radio station, which reaches into the homes of so many people, it
is appropriate that the Commission examine pertinent aspects of
the past history of the applicant." 78
70. Report on Uniform Policy as to Violation by Applicants of Laws of the United
States, No. 9572, 1 P & F R. io REG. (pt. 3) 91:495 (1951).
71. Id. at 91:500.
72. ANTrausT SuncoMm R EoRT 3181.
73. 180 F2d at 33.
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If an applicant has, in his past operations, acted in a manner incon-
sistent with the antitrust laws, it is difficult to see how a grant of his
application can be deemed in the public interest.7 - "It is essential in a
free society," Attorney General Rogers asserted a few years ago, "that
access to a medium of communication as influential as television be
limited only by the public interest. . . . It is also essential that those
granted access to that medium compete without restraint, so that there
will be a maximum of competition in the dissemination of ideas." "
An applicant whose past activities indicate that he will hinder, the
working of competition in broadcasting has hardly shown that he is
qualified to operate a station in the public interest.
Under the Communications Act, an applicant's "character" is
subjected to scrutiny by the FCC.7 That word should be given its
commonly understood meaning and is broad enough to embrace in-
volvement in practices contrary to the antitrust laws.77 "There can
be no doubt," the Supreme Court has affirmed, "that competition is a
relevant factor in weighing the public interest." "8
In the 1950 proceeding which led to the FCC report already re-
ferred to, on the Commission's policy in dealing with applicants who
had violated the antitrust laws and other federal statutes, it had been
argued that the Commission could act against monopolistic practices
only through its rule-making power-not through decisions in, indi-
vidual licensing adjudications. This argument, said the FCC report,
"misses the point of the discussion." - Rule-making deals with an
abuse only after it has developed. In the Commission's words,
"[T]he're are many other monopolistic practices against which
there are no rules. And while, in the course of time, where such
practices are discovered the Commission can adopt rules which
might prevent recurrence of these monopolistic practices, the fact
remains that these monopolistic practices might exist for a long
period of time before they are discovered or corrected." 80
As the famous second Chenery case "' -well shows, both rule-making
and adjudication are basic weapons in the administrative armory.
74. See Alladin Radio & Television, 9 P & F RADIO REG. 1, 37 (1953).
75.'Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce:
Telezision Inquiry, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 404 (1956) (hereinafter cited as
Television Inquiry).
76. 48 Stat. 1084(b) (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §308(b) (1952).
77. Paraphrasing Mester v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 118, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
78. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 94 (1953).
79. 1 P & F RADio REG. (pt. 3) 91:500 (1951).
8o. Ibid.
81. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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Which should be used in a particular case is a matter resting entirely
within the discretion of the agency concerned. In the situation under
discussion, the FCC could act through rule-making or adjudicatory
authority or both. In the past, it has exercised both types of power to
deal with antitrust problems. Thus, it has promulgated rules dealing
with so-called duopoly and multiple ownership to prevent certain types
of excessive concentration in broadcasting.2 But it has also had to
act in individual licensing cases. Indeed, as its 1951 report recognized,
enforcement of antitrust policies in dealing with license applications is
really the only way in which such policies can be effectively implemented
by the FCC. Most antitrust practices cannot be dealt with in advance
by the promulgation of rules. The licensing power of the FCC, on the
other hand, hangs like a constant Damocles' sword over broadcasting.'
It enables the Commission to resolve antitrust questions as they are
dealt with generally in our law-through the "gradual process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion." "' It is through implementing the
basic policy laid down in its 1951 report that the FCC can prevent
monopolistic practices and excessive concentrations of control in broad-
casting.
THE PHiLCO CASE
In actual practice, the FCC has failed to apply the policy articulated
in its 1951 report. This can be seen clearly in the Commission's deci-
sion in the recent Philco case.85 The controversy arose out of the pro-
test by the Philco Corporation of the Commission's grant without a
hearing of the applications of the National Broadcasting Company for
renewal of the licenses of its television and radio stations in Phila-
delphia."6 Philco is not engaged in broadcasting. It is a manufacturer
of radio and electronic equipment and, as such, it is in competition with
Radio Corporation of America, the parent of NBC. Philco in its
protest alleged that RCA had been receiving advertising advantages
from NBC over the Philadelphia stations, and that NBC's so-called
"coption time" and "must buy" practices s' as a network injured Philco
as an advertiser seeking to use the television medium. Essentially,
Philco's claim was that the trade practices of RCA and NBC (particu-
82. 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.35, 3.636 (1958).
83. At present, broadcast licenses are granted only for three-year periods. 48
Stat. 1083 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §307(d) (Supp. V, 1958); 47 C.F.R.
§§3.34, 3.630 (1958).
84. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
85. National Broadcasting Co., 15 P & F RADIo REG. 965 (1957).
86. These were the stations acquired by NBC in the already-discussed NBC-
Westinghouse exchange.
87. See text accompanying notes 116-25 infra.
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larly the network practices of the latter) 88 violated the antitrust laws
and hence reflected adversely on the character qualifications of NBC
as a licensee.
Philco's protest was dismissed by the FCC in a. 1957 decision. 9
In the first place, said the Commission, Philco has no standing to inter-
vene in NBC's license renewal proceeding. "The NBC Philadelphia
station," reads the FCC opinion, "to the extent profitable, will aid
NBC financially, and thus indirectly increase the profits of NBC's
parent RCA, with which Philco is in competition in another line of
commerce. But certainly this is not enough to give Philco standing,
any more than it would give standing to a manufacturer of washing
machines-a product of another subsidiary of RCA." I In addition,
the Commission asserted that, on the merits, Philco had not raised any
issues which required any hearing. It was not enough to allege that
the practices of RCA and NBC violated the antitrust laws, or even to
show that antitrust actions were pending against them.
"We reiterate the view which we have expressed on many oc-
casions in the past, namely, that in circumstances such as those
which pertain herein, the Commission will not act on unresolved
complaints filed in the courts but will be guided by the determina-
tions reached by said courts with respect to the allegations con-
tained in said complaints." 91
The FCC cannot, in other words, consider antitrust violations by an
applicant before it unless a court has finally found the existence of such
violations on his part.
The FCC's Philco opinion is most significant for what it tells us
about the present Commission's attitude toward its regulatory tasks.
According to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the
Commission was wrong in holding that Philco did not have standing.
92
The fact that a competing manufacturer was using the licensed facilities
directly to obtain a preferential economic advantage over Philco gave
Philco standing to file its protest.
The important thing for our purposes, however, is not the merits of
the FCC holding on standing, but the fact that the possible lack of
standing in Philco was .actually irrelevant in determining whether the
88. Philco also attacked the patent practices of RCA, relying upon the fact that
an antitrust suit by the United States had been brought against RCA. See text accom-
panying note 211 infra.
89. National Broadcasting Co., 15 P & F RADIO REG. 965 (1957).
90. Id. at 973.
91. Id. at 975.
92. Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
946 (1959).
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Commission should consider the matters raised in the Philco protest.
A regulatory agency like the FCC is not restricted to the neutral
position of a court, and, as such, limited to the consideration of claims
presented by parties properly before it. The Communications Act
requires the FCC itself to determine whether the grant of a particular
application will be in the "public interest." If the antitrust practices
of an applicant reflect adversely on his character and ability to serve
the "public interest," such practices must be fully considered by the
Commission before it can decide whether to grant the application. That
being the case, what difference should it make whether or not alleged
antitrust practices are brought to the FCC's attention by one who has
standing? For the Commission to refuse to consider such allegations
because they are made by one without standing is for it to take an
unduly passive view of its own continuing affirmative duty to vindicate
the "public interest."
The same passivism is to be seen in that portion of the FCC's
Philco opinion dealing with its inability to consider alleged antitrust
violations on the part of an applicant unless there has been a court
decision finding him guilty of such violations. The Commission's
holding to this effect is contrary to the judicial authority on the subject.
The claim that the FCC could not act without a court decision on an
antitrust violation was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States.93 According to the Court
there, conduct in violation of the antitrust laws is certainly relevant in
consideration by the Commission of the effect of such conduct upon the
"public interest, convenience, or necessity."
"A licensee charged with practices in contravention of this stand-
ard cannot continue to hold his license merely because his conduct
is also in violation of the anti-trust laws and he has not yet been
proceeded against and convicted. . . . Nothing in the provi-
sions or history of the Act lends support to the inference that the
Commission was denied the power to refuse a license to a station
not operating in the 'public interest,' merely because its misconduct
happened to be an unconvicted violation of the anti-trust laws." 9'
In the words of a recent FCC staff memorandum:
"The court definitely laid down that the FCC should challenge the
qualifications of any broadcast licensee or applicant when it ap-
peared said licensee or applicant could exercise monopolistic con-
trol to the extent that it constituted restraint of trade or unfair
competition under the Sherman or Clayton antitrust Acts, and
93. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
94. Id. at 223. See, similarly, United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 79
Sup. Ct. 457 (1959).
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-that such action could be taken by the FCC whether or not said
licensee or applicant had been adjudged guilty by a Federal Court
of violating one or more provisions of either of said Acts." 9
For the FCC to assume, as it did in the Philco case, that it can
act only after final court decisions. is for it to confuse its regulatory
duties with that of direct enforcement of the antitrust statutes. Whether
or not an applicant's activities have resulted in antitrust convictions,
they still impair his ability to meet the "public interest" criterionY If
the Commission refuses to consider antitrust violations until there are
actual convictions, it is abdicating its authority fully to protect the
public interest. As-it was put by a federal court in a 1947 case,
/"An inquiry which concerned itself only with convictions for
felony or of crimes involving moral turpitude would be grossly
inadequate. It might indeed be most inadvisable from the public
viewpoint to entrust the operation of a radio station to a person
unworthy of belief and evidencing disregard for regulatory laws,
even though he had never been convicted of a felony." "
Thus, the fact that particular antitrust practices have or have not
been adjudged legal or illegal in the courts should not be' conclusive in
the FCC license proceeding. "The Mansfield Journal," said the court
in the already-cited Mansfield Journal case, "has not been convicted of
any such violations. But the statute does not for that reason place the
Journal's past conduct with regard to monopoly and the antitrust laws
beyond the consideration of the Commission." 98 For the Commission
not to consider such conduct is for it to fail to give full effect to the
"public interest" criterion. That criterion itself, declared the chairman
of the Legislative Oversight Subcommittee during a 1958 hearing,
"authorizes the Commission to revoke or to refuse a license to anyone
whose conduct in its judgment is in violation of the antitrust laws, even
though such person has not been convicted of 'violation of the anti-trust
laws.' "9
95. FCC, Summaries of the Parts and Chapters Constituting Report on Patent
Misuses of the Bell System Holding Companies and the RCA 12 (Mimeograph 48731,
1957) (hereinafter cited as Patent Report).
96. See Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
97. Mester v. United States, 70 F.' Supp. 118, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
98. 180 F2d at 33.
99. Hearing's o=. the Federal Communications Commission and Patent Misuse
Before the Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the House Committee
,on Interstate & Foreign Coinrnerce, 'Stenographic Transcript, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
April 23, 1958, vol. 1, p. 6 (hereinafter cited as Patent Hearings).
For other recent FCC decisions similar to National Broadcasting Co., 15 P & F
RAlio REG. 965 (1957), see New Britain Broadcasting Co., 13 P & F RADio REG. 915
(1956)', ABC-Paramount Merger Cose, 8 P & F RADI REG. 541; 575 .(1954).- See
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NETWORKS AND NETWORK PRACTICES
The main beneficiaries of the FCC's permissive attitude toward
practices that may violate the antitrust laws have been the broadcast
networks. It is largely because the Commission has not vigorously
e iforced antitrust policies that the networks have been able to acquire
their present position of dominance in broadcasting. Nor is "domi-
nance" too strong a word to use in this connection. "The record,"
said the FCC in a 1941 report, "reveals at every turn a dominant posi-
tion of the network organization in the field of radio broadcasting." 'o
More recent studies reveal a similar situation with regard to television.
According to a 1957 report of the House Antitrust Subcommittee,
"[I]t is clear that CBS and NBC have a dominant position in the
industry, and therefore exercise vast influence over television
broadcasting and determine in large measure what the American
people may hear and see over their television sets. Moreover the
networks have achieved that dominance and exercise that influence
by using spectrum frequencies that are a precious natural resource
belonging to all the people." 101
More recently, an FCC staff study of network broadcasting re-
ferred to the "high degree of network concentration of control." 102
The two major networks (National Broadcasting Company and Colum-
bia Broadcasting System) in particular occupy a predominant position
in television. Thus, during 1955, NBC and CBS and the nine stations
they owned and operated accounted for some 42 per cent of the total
business done by the television broadcast industry-an industry which
then included some four networks and some 455 TV stations. 10 3
also United Television, Inc., 16 P & F RADIo REG. 259 (1957), where an application
was approved without hearing despite the fact that the United States had instituted
an antitrust action against the applicant. A dissent urged that the FCC should fully
consider this as bearing on the applicant's qualifications to serve the public interest
and that it should make no difference that the antitrust case was still pending and not
decided.deWith these decisions, compare Radio Fort Wayne, 9 P & F RADIo REaG. 1221
(1954), where the FCC ruled against a comparative applicant for a TV channel largely
because its principals were parties to the establishment of joint advertising rates
between two newspapers. At the FCC hearing, they had announced their intention
not to bring about the abandonment of these practices unless a court declared them to
be illegal. According to the Commission, however, "whether the establishment and
use of joint advertising rates by newspapers separately owned is legal or illegal is
not here controlling, the Comnission being concerned, primarily, with the conduct
of the persons involved and the possible effect of such conduct upon the applicant's
disposition to operate a broadcast station in the public interest" Radio Fort Wayne,
supra at 1222k.
100. FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BRO.cASTING app. B (1941).
101. Report o Televi'sion Broadcasting 140.
102. FCC, Network Study Staff, Network Broadcasting, H.R. REP. No. 1297,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 195 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Network Broadcasting).
103. Report on Television Broadcasting 34.
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During the same period, the broadcast income of NBC and CBS con-
stituted 95 per cent of all national network broadcast income. Of the
455 stations licensed in 1955, all but 38 had a network affiliation.'
Especially revealing in this respect are the figures contained in
the recent FCC staff study already referred to. The three networks
now in existence account for close to 70 per cent of national television
time sales, with NBC and CBS accounting for over 62 per cent.'
Network concentration is particularly high in terms of what the study
in question termed "one significant measure"-the proportion of net-
work programs during prime evening hours on television stations
throughout the country."' During the three prime evening hours 107
subject to network option, the three networks account for close to 80
per cent of the total programs carried by commercial TV stations.0'
The proportion is over 90 per cent in the case of the basic stations of
the NBC and CBS networks. In actual fact, the networks frequently
account for virtually the entire viewing audience during the prime
evening hours in a large number of markets throughout the country. 09
Summing up the situation, the FCC staff study asserts that,
"absent a major technological change in the nature of the television
industry or in the form of telecasting, networking will continue to
be characterized by a high concentration of control in the hands
of a small number of firms enjoying substantial profits." 11
Even more disturbing perhaps than the dominant position of the
networks in broadcasting is the fact that they have acquired such
position by practices which appear to violate the antitrust laws. Net-
work operation in practice turns upon the contractual relationships
between the networks and the stations affiliated with them. Though
each network owns and operates a limited number of television stations,
located in the top markets of the country,"' the network organization
itself depends primarily upon some 200 affiliated stations. Network
affiliation is eagerly sought by stations and is essential to successful
commercial operation in this country." In 36 of the top 50 markets
104. Ibid.
105. Network Broadcasting 181-82, 205, 637.
106. Id. at 205, 637.
107. 7:30-10:30 p.m.
108. Network Broadcasting 205, 637.
109. Id. at 193.
110. Id. at 206, 637. That the profits involved justify the characterization "sub-
stantial" is shown by the fact that, in 1955, the broadcast income before tax of NBC
and CBS equalled over 130% of their total property investment. Report on Television
Broadcasting 29.
111. NBC owns 7 TV stations, CBS owns 6, and the American Broadcasting
Company, 5. Network Broadcasting 42.
112. Ibid.
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and in 80 of the top 100 markets, all commercial television stations are
affiliated with one or more networks.113
The network-affiliate relationship is based upon an affiliation
contract. The contracts in use by the three TV networks now in
existence differ in details, but contain the following essential provisions:
1. A recognition of the affiliated station as the network outlet in
a specified community, with the affiliate having the right of first call
to all network programs in that community;
2. Agreement by the affiliate to option to the network certain
enumerated hours during the broadcast day. During these option-time
hours, the affiliate agrees to broadcast all commercial network programs
offered to it, under certain designated conditions;
3. The rate at which the time of the affiliate will be sold to net-
work advertisers and the compensation payable to the affiliate by the
network for broadcasting network commercial programs; "'
4. The undertaking by the network to deliver to the affiliate net-
work programs, either "live," through transmission facilities leased
from American Telephone & Telegraph Company, or on film;
5. A limitation of the contract to a term of two years-the maxi-
mum term permitted by the FCC;
6. A provision which permits termination by the network in the
event the affiliate assigns the contract or undergoes a change in
ownership.15
Of these common provisions in network affiliation contracts, the
most striking is the second, which provides for so-called "option time."
That term, as the head of the Antitrust Division has pointed out, "is
industry shorthand for the contractual arrangements between a network
and its affiliated stations by which the network has an option to require
the stations to take network programs, with certain exceptions, for a
specified number of hours each day." "" Under the contractual provi-
sion in question, the affiliate undertakes to broadcast during "network
option time" all sponsored programs offered by the network, provided
it is given not less than fifty-six days' notice by the latter. This enables
the networks to pre-empt for their commercial programs nine hours a
113. Report on Television Broadcasting 22.
114. The latter is a specified percentage of the network time rate, usually ranging
from 30 to 33%%. Id. at 79.
115. See ibid.; Network Broadcasting 42.
116. ANTrruST SuBcommnirEE REPoRT 4138.
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day of the broadcasting time of almost all the television stations in the
country, including the prime evening hours when the viewing audience
is at its peak.
1 7
According to the House Antitrust Subcommittee, the option-time
provision in affiliation contracts may have the following effects:
.1. It may permit a network to determine TV programming
throughout the country, thus substituting the judgment of the network
for that of the licensee to whom programming responsibility is dele-
gated under the law; 1
2. It may enable the network to prevent competing programs from
having access to TV outlets during the best hours of the broadcast
day;
3. It may place non-network advertisers at a competitive dis-
advantage with network advertisers in obtaining prime broadcast time;
4. It may deprive the public of opportunity to have access to the
widest choice of programs that could be made available in a free
competitive market." 9
It is true that under the option-time provision, the affiliate has a
limited right to reject network programs. 2 Such right is in practice,
however, more theoretical than real, in view of the threat of affilia-
tion cancellation by the network for station failure to broadcast
network programs during option time. Nor is such threat of cancella-
tion a mere theoretical deterrent. Evidence at the House antitrust
hearings indicated that both NBC and CBS had in fact canceled affilia-
tions -because of insufficient clearance of network programs during
option-time periods.' 2 ' Thus, as a 1955 Senate memorandum.put it,
"The significance of time clearances and cancellation provisions cannot
be minimized. It is believed that they create an artificial and competi-
tive advantage for the networks which helps to explain the dominant
position they occupy in the industry." 122
Closely related to the option-time provision is the so-called "must
buy" policy followed by the networks. This policy requires an adver-
tiser, if he desires to use the network, to buy broadcasting time on a
large number of television stations throughout the country. Thus,
CBS requires advertisers to order as a minimum the five CBS-owned
117. Report on Televisi on Broadcasting 87.
118. Compare FCC, REPORT oN CHAiN BRoADCASTING 66 (1941).
119. Report on Television Broadcasting 88.
120. See note 173 infra.
121. Report on Television Broadcasting 89. But see Netuork Broadcasting 642.
122. PzLoTyx 30.
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TV stations plus 51 designated affiiates.lm NBC requires the ad-
vertiser to buy time on the seven NBC-owned stations plus 50
specified affiliated stations.' 2 '
As already mentioned, "must buy" is closely connected with
"option time." It is, indeed, the control which the option-time provi-
sion gives the networks over broadcast time that makes the must buy
policy effective in practice. "There is reason to believe," in the recent
words of the head of the Antitrust Division, "that television advertisers
accept the network-picked package of TV stations because of the net-
works' control, via time options, of prime telecasting time." M
Nor can it be doubted that "must buy" and "option time," taken
together, greatly reinforce the dominant position of the network in
broadcasting. These network practices can, to quote the same official
again,
"unduly restrict the chance of the independent TV station com-
peting with the network affiliate to sell his time to an advertiser
already tied to the network affiliate. This power offers opportunity
for special abuses in cities and towns having only I or 2 VHF
television stations. There a network is obviously tempted to use
the dominant position its affiliates may hold to force the sale of time
on affiliated stations in more competitive cities via 'must buy.' "'8
That the temptation referred to is not only an academic possibility
was shown dramatically in the 1956 testimony before a Senate com-
mittee by the head of an independent station in a highly competitive
market. 127  His station, he said, is constantly faced with situations
where an advertiser has acquired the national rights to a TV program
and desires to have it broadcast in various cities.
"It has been our experience, however, that regardless of whether
KTTV offers a more desirable time period at a lower cost per
thousand than a particular network station in Los Angeles, we
are told by the advertiser or his agency that despite the fact that
the KTTV proposal is more attractive, the advertiser must place
the program on the network station in Los Angeles or he will be
deprived of the opportunity of placing the program on stations
affiliated with that network in other cities." '8
123. Report on Television Broadcasting 85. According to Television Factbook,
Fall-Winter 1957, p. 46, the CBS basic "must-buy" list now includes 58 stations.
124. Report on Television Broadcasting 85. According to Television Factbook,
Fall-Winter 1957, p. 52, the NBC basic "must-buy" list now includes 58 stations.
125. AnTRusT SUBcomiMrE REPORT 4131, 4139.
126. Id. at 4132, 4140. But see Network Broadcasting 647.
127. The market involved was Los Angeles, which has seven VHF teleiision
stations.
128. Television Inquiry 1496.
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Manifestly, the network practices of "option time" and "must buy"
present serious antitrust questions. Certainly there is a striking similar-
ity between these network practices and the practices in the motion-
picture industry which the Supreme Court in 1948 held violated the
antitrust laws." 9 In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,130 the
Court outlawed so-called "block booking," which it defined as "the
practice of licensing, or offering for license, one feature or group of
features on condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature
or group of features released by the distributors during a given
period." 131
Paraphrased to fit "option time," the definition might read,
"The network time option is the network practice of agreeing
or offering to transmit to a station one program or group of
programs on condition that the station will also accept for broad-
cast another program or group of programs to be transmitted by
the network at its option during specified periods of the broadcast
day." 132
If the "option time" practice is thus similar to "block booking," it is,
under the Paramount case, a per se violation of the Sherman Act. If
anything, indeed, as a Senate memorandum points out, "option time"
is a
"more virulent practice than block-booking for not only does it
commit the station in advance to take a whole block of program-
ming, but it is a combination or arrangement between the networks
and their affiliates to oust the programs of important competitors
in order to honor the option." 13
The Supreme Court's motion-picture decisions also appear to
apply to the "must buy" practice. In United States v. Griffith '3 and
Paramount, the Court considered the legality of "master" agreements
between independent theater chains and film distributors, under which
the theater chain was licensed to exhibit the distributor's films on a
first-run basis in all of the theaters of the chain. Some of the theaters
were in single theater towns, while others were in multiple-theater
towns, where they competed with theaters owned by others. The
129. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United
States v. Schine Theatres, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) ; United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100 (1948).
130. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
131. 334 U.S. at 156.
132. Televisi; Inquiry 1542.
133. Porm"n 33.
134. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
NETWORK DOMINANCE
Supreme Court held such "master" agreements to be violative of the
Sherman Act, declaring that
"they eliminate the possibility of bidding for films theatre by
theatre. In that way they eliminate the opportunity for the small
competitor to obtain the choice first runs, and put a premium on
the size of the circuit. They are, therefore, devices for stifling
competition and diverting the cream of the business to the large
operators." '
Much the same can be said about the "must buy" policy of the
networks. In any television market, the number of stations is limited.
In some markets, the stations affiliated with the networks are the only
stations in the market."8 Said the Court in Griffith:
"A man with a monopoly of theatres in any one town commands
the entrance for all films into that area. If he uses that strategic
position to acquire exclusive privileges in a city where he has
competitors, he is employing his monopoly power as a trade
weapon against his competitors." M
This is as true in the field of television as in that of motion pictures.
"Must buy," like the "master" agreements condemned in the motion-
picture cases, "eliminate the opportunity for the small competitor [the
independent TV station] to obtain the choice first runs [sponsored
programs], and put a premium on the size of the circuit [i.e., the
network] ." 188
Moreover, the "must buy" practice clearly seems to come within
the broad proscription of "tying arrangements" recently enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States.89 As
stated there, "a tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a
party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also
purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will
not purchase that product from any other supplier." 140 In the
Northern Pacific case, the railroad had sold and leased land on condition
that the grantees and lessees ship over the railroad's lines all com-
modities produced or manufactured on the land. The Court held that
these "preferential routing" clauses constituted tying agreements pro-
hibited by the Sherman Act.
A network imposing its "must buy" policy is forcing the same kind
of tying arrangement upon its advertisers. The network agrees to sell
135. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 154 (1948).
136. See Television Inquiry 1543.
137. 334 U.S. at 107.
138. Televzsion Inquiry 1543.
139. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
140. 356 U.S. at 5, 6.
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one product (time on the affiliated stations in markets desired by the
advertiser) only on the condition that the buyer also purchases the
different (or tied) product (time on one or more stations on the net-
work's "must buy" list)."- Advertiser acceptance of the "must buy"
policy in these circumstances means that the network has used its
network position as an economic lever to require the advertiser to take
not only stations that he wants but also stations that he may not want.'
4 2
The "must buy" practice thus seems to fit squarely within the Northern
Pacific definition of a tying arrangement. 4 3
What is particularly significant about the Northern Pacific decision
is the Court's express recognition of the tying arrangement as a per se
violation of the Sherman Act even though, in a given case, there is no
monopoly power over the tying product. In its 1953 decision in Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States," the Court had implied the
contrary, stating there that "the essence of illegality in tying agree-
ments is the wielding of monopolistic leverage. . ., 14. The net-
works themselves had strongly relied upon the Times-Picayune case,
asserting that, under it, the rule making tie-ins illegal per se did not
apply to them because they did "not have the necessary dominance or
leverage in any item to make a tie-in sale of it invalid under the rule." 146
The Northern Pacific opinion clearly rejects the implication of
Times-Picayune upon which the networks have relied. "While there
is some language in the Times-Picayune opinion," says Mr. Justice
Black, "which speaks of 'monopoly power' or 'dominance' over the
tying product as a necessary precondition for application of the rule of
per se unreasonableness to tying arrangements, we do not construe this
general language as requiring anything more than sufficient economic
power to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied
product. . . ." 147 The Northern Pacific opinion thus condemns
tying arrangements, of the type involved in the network practices under
141. See Network Broadcasting 512. "Assume, for example, that an advertiser
wants to sponsor a network program and wants that program to be carried by 70
stations affiliated with CBS or NBC, which he designates. Assume further that only
35 of these stations are on the must-buy list of the network. In this situation the
advertiser, for the sake of getting the stations he wants, not only will have to buy far
more than the minimum basic required group, he will have to buy time for some
25 stations which may be of little or no value to him." Report o Television Broad-
casting 86.
142. Ibid.
143. See, similarly, Network Broadcasting 512, written before the Supreme Court's
decision in the Northern Pacific case.
144. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
145. 345 U.S. at 611.
146. Opinion and Memorandum of CBS Counsel, Television Inquiry 1971. See,
similarly, ANTiTmUST SuscommIrEE REoRr 3531.
147. 356 U. S. at 11.
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discussion, as wholly inconsistent with the fundamental principles of
the antitrust laws."4" Under Northern Pacific, "the vice of tying
arrangements lies in the use of economic power in one market to
restrict competition on the merits in another, regardless of the source
from which the power is derived and whether the power takes the
form of a monopoly or not." 149
Even before the Northern Pacific decision, the opinion that the
"must buy" and "option time" practices violated the antitrust laws was
expressed in congressional reports.' 50  More recently, the same view
was taken in an FCC staff study of network broadcasting.' 5 ' The
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has also articulated
concern at the antitrust problems involved in present-day networking.
In testimony given in 1956 before a House subcommittee, the head of
that Division called attention to "the striking similarity between TV
industry structure and that movie pattern condemned in Paramount.
. Networks' control over the nation's TV stations dwarfs the
majors' power over theaters condemned in Paramount." 52 At this
hearing, the head of Antitrust stated that his Division was conducting
an investigation into network practices. That investigation has now
apparently been concluded. At a conference held on April 24, 1958, the
head of Antitrust advised the FCC commissioners that the basic
practices of the networks definitely violated the antitrust laws. Such
violations, he said, came within the per se rule and hence must
automatically be presumed to be prohibited restraints of trade. 5'
THE COMMISSION AND THE NETWORKS
In its 1941 Chain Broadcasting report, the FCC declared that we
in this country have
"rejected government ownership of broadcasting stations, be-
lieving that the power inherent in control over broadcasting is too
great and too dangerous to the maintenance of free institutions to
permit its exercise by one body, even though elected by or
responsible to the whole people. But in avoiding the concentration
of power over radio broadcasting in the hands of government, we
must not fall into an even more dangerous pitfall: The concentra-
tion of that power in the hands of self-perpetuating management
groups." 154
148. 356 U.S. at 10.
149. 356 U.S. at 11.
150. See PLOTEIN 33; Report on Television Broadcasting 86, 90.
151. Network Broadcasting 389, 524.
152. ANTiuRusT SU rcoMITTEr REPORT 4139.
153. N.Y. Times, June 1, 1958, p. 1, col. 1.
154. FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 72 (1941).
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In the Chain Broadcasting report, the FCC found the danger
referred to to be a very real one because of the dominance over broad-
casting which had been attained by the major networks: "NBC and
CBS now dominate this field; their ownership and operation of im-
portant radio stations and their restrictive long-term contracts with
other stations enable them to maintain indefinitely their present
monopolistic position." 155
Today, almost two decades later, the situation in television is, if
anything, worse than it was in radio at the time the Chain Broadcasting
report was made. Thus, the degree of network control over present-
day TV seems much greater even than that which was condemned in
the movie industry in the already-referred-to Paramount case. The
Court in Paramount found that "the five majors in 1945 had interests
in somewhat over 17 per cent of the theatres in the United States-
3,137 out of 18,076." 1r6 In addition, "in the 92 cities of the country
with populations over 100,000 at least 70 per cent of all the first-run
theatres are affiliated with one or more of the five majors." IGT Com-
pare this with the comparable figures for television: "As of 9 days ago,"
stated the head of the Antitrust Division in September 1956, "our
evidence indicated there were 366 VHF television stations and 91
UHF stations--or a total of 457 commercial TV stations in this
country. Of this 457, about 35 are independent stations with no
network affiliation. From these statistics, it seems clear the networks
own or are affiliated with more than 90 per cent of the television
stations in this country." 15s Moreover, the three networks, as of
July 1957, each covered almost 25 per cent of the country's population
through their own owned and operated stations alone. 59 When we
add to these statistics the fact, as discussed in a prior section, 10 that
the networks' present position has depended upon practices which seem
to violate the antitrust laws, we may well wonder what the FCC has
been doing in this area since the Chain Broadcasting report.
Present Commission attitudes on specific network practices seem
to be in harmony with the general disregard of antitrust principles
which Mr. Doerfer's testimony, discussed above,' 6 ' illustrates. When
in the course of a Senate hearing at the beginning of 1956 Mr. Doerfer
was asked whether the "must buy" policy might not be in restraint of
155. Id. at 48.
156. 334 U.S. at 167.
157. Ibid.
158. ANTiTRusT SUcoMMImTE REPoRT 4139.
159. Network Broadcasting 184.
160. See text accompanying notes 129-53 supra.
161. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
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trade, he answered that it might be, where "the sponsor wants to buy
more than the network is willing to sell." But, he went on, "certainly
not where a sponsor thinks that he can get 80 per cent of the people of
this country by X dollars and the network comes along and says now
we are going to make you spend a little more so that you get the 95
per cent of the country." '
Later that year, in testimony before the House Antitrust Sub-
committee, Doerfer elaborated on his position. "I thought it would be
good public policy, would be doing this country a favor, if the network,
regardless of the cost to them or to the advertiser, compelled them to
program on some stations which the advertiser, for reasons of economy,
decided to reject." '6 Doerfer disposed of the tying objection with the
proposition that "if I go into a store and I want to buy a pair of pants
and the fellow says I have got to buy the coat too, I do not necessarily
construe that as an unfair trade practice." 14
This complete lack of understanding of the basic principles of anti-
trust is reflected in the Commission's operation. In the first place, the
Commission has aggravated the antitrust problem, insofar as the net-
works are concerned, by its decision in the 1952 ABC-Paramount
Merger Case.'65 The decision there approved the merger of the Ameri-
can Broadcasting Company network and United Paramount Theatres,
despite the strong suggestion of the Attorney General that such a
merger might substantially lessen competition in both the broadcasting
and the motion-picture industries.166  To the two major networks
whose business practices and dominance were tainted with possible
illegality under the antitrust laws, the Commission added a third net-
work, many of whose principals had previously been found guilty of
serious antitrust violations.
167
162. ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 3517. (Emphasis added.)
163. Ibid.
164. Id. at 3518.
165. 8 P & F RADIo REG. 541 (1952).
166. See ANTRUST SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 3246.
167. See the opinion of Commissioner Hennock, dissenting in ABC-Paramount,
for the details of such previous violations. 8 P & F RADIo REG. at 631(37). The
Commission avoided consideration of most of these violations by enunciating the
principle that it would not consider antitrust histories further back than three years.
Paramount Pictures, 8 P & F RAiDo REG. 135 (1952). According to the Hennock
dissent, this limitation "had the unfortunate effect of eviscerating the anti-trust issue."
8 P & F RADio REG. at 631(38). Paramount had operated under a consent decree
during the three years prior to the instant case. "As this would reasonably be
expected to deter further violations . . . , evidence of post-1948 activities . . .
should not be relied upon exclusively as indicative of a law-abiding disposition."
Ibid.
It should be noted that the FCC has not applied the three-year limitation in other
cases. See, e.g., Westinghouse Radio Stations, 10 P & F RADio REG. 878 (1955).
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The ABC-Paramount decision could at least be justified on the
ground that it would strengthen ABC and enable it to compete more
effectively with NBC and CBS."' One can disagree with the FCC
approval of the merger and still recognize that a reasonable man might
accept this justification. The same is not, however, true of the
Commission's passivism in the face of network dominance. A com-
mission which gave more than formal support to antitrust policies would
not sit by idly while control over its regulated industry became ever
more concentrated-especially if such concentration was effected by
practices which themselves appear to violate the antitrust laws.
That the FCC can act directly against network practices is shown
by the Chain Broadcasting Regulations ' 9 which it promulgated in
1941. In 1938, the Commission authorized an investigation to deter-
mine what special regulations applicable to networks were required in
the public interest. After extensive investigation and hearings, the
Commission promulgated its 1941 regulations." They were based
upon the proposition that, though the networks as such were not
directly subject to FCC regulation, their practices deemed contrary to
the public interest could be reached through the Commission's regula-
tory power over their affiliates. Hence, the Chain Broadcasting Regula-
tions provided that the Commission would refuse to grant or renew
the licenses of affiliates having contracts with networks containing
any of the provisions specified in the regulations. Of course, the prac-
tical effect of the regulations was to outlaw the provisions in affiliation
contracts which the Commission specified. As Chief Justice Stone put
it in an important case,
"It is common experience that men conform their conduct to
regulations by governmental authority so as to avoid the un-
pleasant legal consequences which failure to conform entails. And
in this case it is alleged without contradiction that numerous
affiliated stations have conformed to the regulations to avoid
loss of their licenses." 171
Though the Supreme Court upheld the power of the FCC to
promulgate the Chain Broadcasting Regulations in 1943,'7 they have
not proved effective in practice. The regulations themselves were
substantially weakened by the Commission before they were issued in
168. See ANTrrRuST SucommiTTEE REPoRT 3241.
169. 6 Fed Reg. 2282 (1941).
170. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 193-96
(1943), for the history of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations.
171. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 (1942).
172. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
NETWORK DOMINANCE
their final form-largely because of vigorous network protests. Thus,
the regulations as originally promulgated, outlawed "option time,"
while those finally issued permitted that practice.173 Above all, how-
ever, the Chain Broadcasting Regulations proved ineffective to curb the
networks because the FCC seriously underestimated both the economic
power of the networks and the practical realities of broadcasting. The
Commission thought it could deal with improper network practices by
trying to eliminate exclusivity of affiliation, limiting the terms of affilia-
tion contracts, and permitting affiliates to refuse network programs
under specified conditions. The realities of broadcasting have, however,
made network affiliation all but essential for successful commercial
operation of television stations.' 4  Because of this, the affiliates are,
in practice, as much under the control of the networks as they were
before the FCC acted. The regulations may prevent the network from
barring another station from taking the network's programs that are
rejected by the affiliate. But, since there is no provision requiring the
network to offer programs to another station and there is practical
pressure on affiliates to accept network programs, this does not really
eliminate exclusivity of affiliation in practice. The same is true of the
formal power given affiliates to refuse to accept network programs even
during periods of "option time." The dependence of the affiliate upon
affiliation, as we have already seen, 75 makes the affiliate accept the
network programs despite its theoretical right of rejection. Nor is the
FCC limitation of affiliation contracts to two years any more effective.
In reality, since most affiliates are utterly dependent upon their affilia-
tions, they are completely tied to the networks, regardless of the formal
terms of the affiliation contracts.
The inadequacies in practice of the Chain Broadcasting Regula-
tions do not, all the same, alter the basic possession by the FCC of the
power to deal by regulation with network practices. "We conclude
. ," reads the Supreme Court's 1943 opinion upholding the regula-
tions, "that the Communications Act of 1934 authorized the Commis-
sion to promulgate regulations designed to correct the abuses disclosed
by its investigation of chain broadcasting." 176 That same power can
173. See Report on Televsion Broadcasting 91-92. Under the FCC regulations,
affiliates must be given the right to refuse to broadcast programs which they reason-
ably believe to be unsatisfactory or unsuitable or contrary to the public interest and
to substitute for network programs others of outstanding local or national importance.
Id. at 87. As already pointed out, see text following note 120 supra, the rights of
the affiliates in this respect are not exercised in practice.
i74. Network Broadcasting 41.
175. See text following note 120 supra.
176. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943).
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be used today to correct the abuses involved in the current network
practices.
But the FCC's power in this field is not limited to the promulgation
of regulations which are aimed at abusive network practices. As em-
phasized earlier in this Article, the Communications Act expressly
requires the Commission to exercise its licensing powers in accordance
with its conception of "public interest" in particular cases. If the
networks are engaged in practices which contravene the antitrust laws,
it is difficult to see how the FCC can find that the grant or renewal of
station licenses to them is in the public interest. In recent years, alleged
antitrust violations by the networks have been raised before the Com-
mission in licensing cases involving network-owned stations, both by
private parties and FCC staff memoranda. The Commission has,
nevertheless, avoided the issue by decisions like those in the already-
discussed Philco case,' 7 7 holding that it cannot consider antitrust matters
in licensing cases unless there has been a court decision finding an
applicant guilty of antitrust violations. This, we have stressed, is a
wholly gratuitous limitation by the FCC on its powers in licensing
cases. Under both the language of the Communications Act and
judicial decisions, the Commission itself must determine whether
practices on the part of its licensees are contrary to the "public interest."
Nothing in the statute, to paraphrase the leading Supreme Court utter-
ance on the subject, 78 lends support to the view that the Commission
can avoid that determination merely because the practices in question
happen to be unconvicted violations of the antitrust laws.
FCC AND PATENT MONOPOLY
The FCC passivism in the face of network dominance and network
practices that appear to violate the antitrust laws is even more striking
when we consider the patent history of the Radio Corporation of
America, the parent of the NBC network. RCA's patent position in
the field of broadcasting starts with a series of cross-licensing agree-
ments made during 1920-23 between various companies of the Bell
System17 and the then major radio patent holding companies.1s
These agreements gave RCA a position of complete dominance in the
manufacture and sale of radio broadcast receivers and tubes. In the
177. See note 89 supra. See also cases cited note 99 supra.
178. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223 (1943).
179. These were the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. and the Western
Electric Co. See Patent Report 2.
180. These were the General Electric Co., the Radio Corporation of America
and the Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. See ibid.
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words of a 1923 report of the Federal Trade Commission on the radio
industry,
"There is no question that the pooling of all the patents pertaining
to vacuum tubes has resulted in giving the Radio Corporation and
its affiliates a monopoly in the manufacture, sale and use thereof.
With such a monopoly, the Radio Corporation apparently has the
power to stifle competition in the manufacture and sale of receiving
sets." 181
Section 13 of the Radio Act of 1927 authorized the Federal Radio
Commission (the forerunner of the FCC) to refuse a license to any
person adjudged guilty by a court of monopolizing radio communica-
tions directly or indirectly through the control of the manufacture or
sale of radio apparatus."' In 1928, a federal court found that RCA
had been using the patent position conferred upon it by the 1920-23
agreements in a manner that violated the antitrust laws."85 RCA
had issued a package license for broadcast receivers, which required the
licensees to install RCA tubes in each receiver manufactured and sold
under the licenses. According to the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, the provision concerning tubes in the package licenses was an
illegal tying arrangement under section 3 of the Clayton Act.""4 "This
contract or understanding between the defendant and the licensees," the
court declared, "has actually resulted in the monopoly of the radio tube
business by the defendant." 185
In 1931, the Federal Radio Commission conducted a proceeding
to determine whether or not the licenses of NBC should be revoked
because of RCA's violation of the Clayton Act. In a three-to-two de-
cision, the Commission held that RCA's particular offense in requiring
licensees to employ RCA tubes for receivers made by them did not
constitute monopolization of radio communications and hence it did
not have the power to revoke NBC's licenses under section 13 of the
1927 Act.' 8  Thus RCA's antitrust violation had no effect insofar as
serving to disqualify it or its subsidiary from meeting the "public
interest" criterion.
In 1930, the Government brought a civil antitrust action against
the companies involved in the 1920-23 cross-licensing agreements,
181. Quoted in Patent Hearings 24.
182. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, § 13, 44 Stat. 1167.
183. Radio Corp. of America v. Lord, 28 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1928).
184. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §14 (1952).
185. Radio Corp. of America v. Lord, 28 F2d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 1928).
186. Radio Corp. of America, P & F RADio REG. Digest M-201 (Federal Radio
Comm'n, June 24, 1931).
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including RCA. This action terminated in consent decrees of 1932
and 1935.187 According to recent testimony of the FCC patent counsel,
however, these decrees did not really alter the dominant patent position
of RCA in the broadcast field. 8" By 1939, indeed, an RCA brochure
was able to state that "practically all domestic manufacturers of broad-
cast receivers" were operating under RCA licenses.' 89 In an FCC
staff memorandum of May 27, 1939, it was pointed out that RCA
would acquire complete patent control over television receivers should
it acquire a certain patent owned by the Farnsworth Company.'9 At
a Senate hearing the next year, this view was confirmed by the president
of RCA himself. He stated that the DuMont Laboratories had no
invention that RCA needed in its TV system, but that the Farnsworth
Company did have such patents, and that the industry would need
licenses under the Farnsworth patents as well as those of RCA for the
manufacture of TV broadcast equipment. 9 '
On November 21, 1945, the FCC adopted technical standards for
black and white television broadcasting which could be met only by
equipment manufactured under the RCA and Farnsworth patents.
92
Despite warnings by its patent staff that this could lead to an RCA
patent monopoly over television, 93 no patent questions were permitted
by the FCC during the proceedings and no testimony whatever was
adduced respecting patent control of the equipment required under the
standards to be promulgated.
In 1947, RCA purchased the unrestricted right to sublicense and
retain royalties on all Farnsworth TV receiver broadcast patents.
"This," asserts a recent FCC staff memorandum, "placed complete
patent control in RCA of receivers for black and white transmission of
TV broadcast stations operating pursuant to FCC technical standards.
After RCA's purchase of these sublicensing rights it soon realized a
complete monopoly in the business of licensing others to manufacture
and sell TV broadcast receivers." 19'
In 1948-1950, the patent staff of the FCC conducted investigations
which led to memoranda informing the Commission of RCA's patent
position in the television field. In 1949, RCA had 87 licensees that
were building video receivers under the patents it owned or could
187. Patent Report 6.
188. Patent Hearings 30.
189. Ibid.
190. See Patent Report 12.
191. Id. at 13.
192. FCC No. 6780 (Nov. 21, 1945). See Patent Report 14.
193. Ibid.
194. Id. at 14-15.
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sublicense.9 5 This constituted practically all of the companies 196 then
engaged in the manufacture and sale of TV receivers. The information
revealed by its staff led the Commission to enlarge its proceeding for
the formulation of technical standards for color television, which it held
during 1949-1950, in order to ascertain the patents and inventions
owned and controlled by the parties to the proceeding.
The patent information revealed during the 1949-1950 proceeding
indicated that RCA had complete patent control over the dot sequential
color system which it proposed. The Columbia Broadcasting System,
on the other hand, had no such control over the field sequential system
which it proposed . 9 7 This was one of the main factors which led the
FCC, in September 1950, to adopt technical standards for color trans-
missions pursuant to the CBS system.' 8
The CBS system, however, had the basic defect of noncompati-
bility, i.e., it could not be received at all on the black and white sets in
the hands of the public. The CBS system could, all the same, be made
compatible through the attachment of inexpensive tuning brackets on
the black and white receivers.' 99 In its report adopting the CBS system,
the FCC proposed that future black and white sets sold to the public
should be equipped with such tuners, which would enable them to re-
ceive the CBS system color transmissions in black and white.
200 At
that time, practically all TV receiver manufacturers were operating
under RCA patent licenses. It is not surprising perhaps that these
licensees refused to adopt the FCC proposal with regard to tuners. As
the Commission put it in its Second Color TV Report, the manufac-
turers who have responded-and these manufacturers represent the
greatest part of the manufacturing capacity of the television industry-
have indicated that they are unable or unwilling to meet the require-
ments as to brackets set forth in the Commission's first report."'
We do not know whether any pressure was brought upon them by their
licensor; but we do know that their refusals effectively "killed" the
CBS color system which the FCC had adopted. As a practical matter,
a noncompatible system could not succeed unless tuning brackets such
as the Commission had proposed were attached to black and white
receivers.
195. Id. at 16.
196. Except for two manufacturers.
197. Patent Report 17.
198. Second Color Television Report, 1 P & F RADIo RE. (pt. 3) 91:441 (1950).
199. See First Color Television Report, 1 P & F RADio REG. (pt. 3) 91:265,
91:301 (1950).
200. Second Color Television Report, supra note 198, at 91:443.
201. Ibid.
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In 1953, RCA and NBC filed a petition with the FCC for sub-
stituting RCA's system and technical standards for TV color trans-
missions; the petition claimed that the CBS system had been rendered
((sterile." 2 "This," says a recent FCC staff memorandum, "was
correct in that RCA and its TV receiver patent licensees had so
decreed in 1950, when they refused to promote standards for TV
receiver tuning brackets which would make such receivers capable of
accepting and reproducing CBS color system transmissions in black
and white, and thus be compatible with both color and black and white
transmissions." 203
On December 17, 1953, the FCC adopted the substitute technical
standards for color TV advocated by the RCA petition.20° The Com-
mission did so without holding any hearing and without consideration
of any patent issues. This was true despite the fact that the Commis-
sion's own patent adviser had submitted memoranda to it indicating
the serious antitrust consequences of its acting without considering
patent matters. 20 5 In addition, in October 1953, the then head of the
Antitrust Division had written to the FCC chairman asking that his
Division be advised of the patent holding positions of the parties in-
terested in the proposed color standards, so that it could determine
whether such patent positions had antitrust implications.206 The FCC
chairman replied by letter refusing the patent information sought, stat-
ing that there was no warrant for delaying the adoption of the proposed
system in order first to secure detailed patent information of the type
requested. 0 7
By its approval of the December 17, 1953, color TV standards, the
FCC, in effect, adopted a color TV system over which one company had
all but complete patent control. The Commission's action in this respect
was a striking confirmation of a 1958 assertion before a congressional
committee by William H. Bauer, who served as patent adviser to the
FCC for over twenty years, that, in recent years, "the FCC majority
has voted hands-off as to patent monopolistic practices." "
The FCC's summary action in adopting the RCA-system color
TV standards was completely contrary to its publicly professed policy
in patent matters. Said the Commission in a letter to the head of the
Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee in 1949,
202. Patent Report 21.
203. Ibid.
204. FCC No. 10637 (Dec. 17, 1953). See Patent Report 23.
205. See Patent Hearings 50-51.
206. Patent Report 23.
207. Ibid.
208. Patent Hearings 49.
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"The Commission has no control over manufacturers as such.
However, with reference to manufacturers who are either licensees
or applicants for licenses, the Commission can and does consider
their activities with respect to any monopolistic patent control
they may exercise or any activities which constitute restraint of
trade or unfair competition within the meaning of the Sherman or
Clayton Act in order to determine the qualifications of such
persons to operate a radio station in the public interest. . . . If
it should turn out that any one company or group of companies are
in a position to acquire or exercise monopoly control in the in-
dustry as a result of patents held by them, we would refer the
matter to the Department of Justice for appropriate action under
the antitrust laws, or, if the manufacturer were a licensee, or an
applicant for a license, the Commission would consider such facts
in determining whether the manufacturer was qualified to operate
a radio station in the public interest. Or the Commission could
take both steps." 209
In actuality, the FCC in recent years has taken neither step. This
has been true even though Mr. Bauer, the Commission's own patent
adviser, sent constant reports urging the FCC to take action both in
cases involving the promulgation of new standards and in cases involv-
ing applications for new licenses or renewals filed by NBC, RCA's
subsidiary.21 The FCC, so far as can be determined from analysis of
its files, flatly refused to give any consideration to these reports.
The Antitrust Division, on the other hand, to which copies of the
Bauer memoranda had been sent, used them as a starting point for the
working up of both civil and criminal antitrust actions against RCA.21'
These actions, which were directed against RCA's patent position and
practices, were concluded in October 1958 with a consent decree and the
imposition of a substantial fine.212
Had the FCC itself taken action to deal with the RCA patent posi-
tion, particularly in color television, these antitrust suits might not
have been necessary. Just before the Commission adopted the RCA
color system at the end of 1953, Stanley N. Barnes (then head of the
Antitrust Division) personally went to see the FCC chairman and
strongly urged that the Commission hold a public hearing on the patent
situation, which, said Barnes, presented serious antitrust questions.
213
209. Reply by Commission to Questions of Senate Interstate Commerce Committee,
1 P & F RADIo REo. (pt. 3) 91:125, 91:128, 91:130 (1949).
210. See Patent Hearings 50.
211. United States v. RCA, Civil No. 97-38, S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 19, 1954;
United States v. RCA, Crim. No. 155-107, S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 21, 1958.
212. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1958, p. 1, cols. 2-3.
213. The author has seen a memorandum of this meeting.
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Just as in the already-discussed NBC-Westinghouse case, however, the
views of the Antitrust Division carried practically no weight in the
FCC.
CONCLUSION
Mention has already been made of the Chain Broadcasting report
and regulations promulgated by the FCC in 1941. Despite the fears
of the networks," 4 in deference to which the prohibition against "option
time" was dropped," 5 networking has prospered under the regula-
tions.2  If anything, in fact, network dominance in the field of tele-
vision today is greater than it was in radio in 1941.
Yet, as so often happens, administrative apathy, at least when it
becomes this gross, calls forth its own cure in the form of congressional
inquiry and prodding. Under the urging of a key congressional
study, 17 sometimes referred to as the Plotkin memorandum, prepared
for the Senate Commerce Committee in 1955,218 the FCC applied for
and received sufficient appropriations to finance a comprehensive study
of the network problem.
The study, which was conducted during 1955-1957 by a specially
appointed staff under the direction of Dean Roscoe L. Barrow, urges
far-reaching changes in the FCC's passive approach toward the net-
works. In the first place, it urges the definite outlawing by the Com-
mission of both "option time" and "must buy." Both network
practices "should be prohibited through a Commission regulation." 219
According to the study, the network practices in question appear to be
illegal under the antitrust laws; " their elimination would permit
competitive forces in broadcasting the freer play which the Congress
intended them to have. "Adoption of the recommendations should
result in a greater degree of competition in broadcasting, programming
which is more responsive to community needs, and a more nearly
nationwide service. The viewing public would have available a wider
variety of television service and a more varied program fare." "'
But the Barrow report does not stop with the prohibition of the
network practices in question in its recommendations. In addition, it
urges a limitation upon the right-of the networks to own stations. This
214. See PLoT=IN 34.
215. See Report on Televion Broadcasting 91.
216. PLOTiN 34.
217. PLoTmiq.
218. Copies were sent to both the FCC and the Attorney General.
219. Network Broadcasting 398, 527, 658, 659.
220. Id. at 527, 658-59.
221. Id. at 666.
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would be accomplished by amendment of the FCC's so-called multiple
ownership rule. Under the Commission's present regulations, networks
and other multiple owners are permitted to own up to seven television
stations. 2 In its Chain Broadcasting report, the FCC had referred
to the serious effect of network station ownership upon competition in
broadcasting. Such ownership, it asserted, has permitted the networks
to "bottle up" the best broadcast facilities." Indeed, it stated that if
"the question were presented as an original matter at this time, the
Commission might well reach the conclusion that the business of station
operations and network operation should be entirely separated." 224
The ownership of stations by the networks appears to present the
same type of antitrust problems that the ownership of theater chains
by the motion-picture companies raised in the already-referred-to
Paramount caseYm "Ownership of a large number of stations by a
single interest," declared the head of the Antitrust Division in 1956
congressional testimony, "raises real antitrust problems. Such owners
would be in a position to use tactics similar to those of the Griffith,
Schine & Crescent motion-picture circuits by capitalizing on mass
purchasing power and by combining their outlets in single-station
markets." 226 This is especially true where the networks themselves
are large multiple owners. Said a federal court in 1957: "[I]t is
desirable for local television stations and network organizations to be
independent of each other, and thus to assure that networks can freely
compete for affiliation with local stations and local stations freely
compete for network affiliation. . . ."
The Barrow report stated that, in its opinion, "that pattern of
television station ownership which is most in the public interest is one
television station to each licensee." 22 It did not, however, go so far
as to advocate that the FCC do more than seek such a pattern "in the
long run." 29 For the present, it recommended only that the Com-
mission prohibit the ownership of more than three VHF stations in
markets which are within the twenty-five largest markets in the
country.20 Its primary impact would be on the network multiple
owners, which now own stations in the major markets." 1 In actuality,
222. 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.335, 3.636 (1958). This can include up to 5 VHF stations.
223. FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 67 (1941).
224. Ibid.
225. See note 129 supra.
226. ANTITRUST SUBcoMMrrT REPoRT 4122.
227. Sunbeam Television Corp. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 26, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
228. Network Broadcasting 592.
229. Ibid.
230. Id. at 596.
231. Ibid.
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this impact would not be very great and the report goes on to urge that
the Commission itself "should review from time to time the ownership
of stations by networks . . . and if it is found that a network can be
divested of additional stations without endangering the network's
program service, such divestiture should be required." "2
The Barrow recommendations are now under consideration by the
FCC itself. Though one may feel that, in some respects (as on the
problem of network ownership of stations), they do not go far enough,
it cannot be doubted that their adoption and implementation by the FCC
would do much to bring the Commission into line with the basic spirit
of our antitrust laws and policies. Certainly such action by the FCC
would constitute a major step toward resolving the problem of network
dominance.
But there is another major piece of unfinished business for the
Commission in the antitrust field. 3  That is for it to abandon the
unsound policy laid down in the Philco case " and to exercise its
affirmative duty to determine whether licensees who have engaged in
practices that restrain competition meet the "public interest" criterion.
The Commission should not abdicate its statutory duty merely because
an applicant's conduct may happen to constitute an unconvicted viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. Nor is it a valid argument that the FCC,
in following its statutory duty here, would be imposing too harsh a
penalty upon licensees and applicants. Essentially the same argument
was rejected by the Supreme Court in FCC v. WOKO.' The denial
of a radio license, said Justice Jackson, is not an improper penalty:
"It may hurt and it may cause loss, but it is not made illegal, arbitrary
or capricious by that fact." "
Administrative suggestion, in the form of the Barrow study,
congressional inquiry, and professional comment, such as this Article
represents, however, can only point the way; they cannot force a
reluctant Commission into a course of action which is distasteful to it.
And if, as seems likely, the Barrow recommendations descend into the
bureaucratic limbo prepared for them, the evil of network dominance
will persist uncontrolled.
232. Id. at 598.
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time be outlawed. By a 4-3 vote, the Commission approved option time as "reason-
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One who recalls the sanguine hopes of the 1930's might be
prompted to ask: What went wrong with the regulatory commissions?
The FCC is a clear example of a regulatory agency that has assimilated
the "public interest" to that of the dominant members of the regulated
industry. Opinions may differ, to be sure, on the reasons for the
FCC's benevolent attitude toward the networks. Some may point to
the all-pervasive pattern of fraternization and favor-giving between
networks and commissioners brought out in the hearings of the Legisla-
tive Oversight Subcommittee. Others may emphasize the dependence
of FCC commissioners and staff upon the industry for future economic
opportunities. a8 Still others may assert, in Herblock's recent words,
"There are cases where words are superfluous. As somebody once said,
'The milk-wagon horse knows where to stop.' "
It may well be that, in this respect, the experience of the FCC is
far from unique among federal regulatory agencies. To borrow from
the language of a Senate subcommittee report of a few years ago, per-
haps the problem is most neatly put this way:
"A subtle malady which is apparently institutional rather than
personal in its incidence is the tendency of the independent regula-
tory commissions not to die, but to fade away; with advancing
age they tend to become the servants rather than the governors of
the industries which they regulate." 240
238. See note 35 supra.
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